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Should monetary policymakers take the staff forecast of the effects of policy actions as given, or should
they attempt to include additional information?  This paper seeks to shed light on this question by
testing the usefulness of the FOMC's own forecasts.  Twice a year, the FOMC makes forecasts of major
macroeconomic variables.  FOMC members have access to the staff forecasts when they prepare their
forecasts.  We find that the optimal combination of the FOMC and staff forecasts in predicting inflation
and unemployment puts a weight of essentially zero on the FOMC forecast and essentially one on
the staff forecast:  the FOMC appears to have no value added in forecasting.  The results for predicting
real growth are less clear-cut.  We also find statistical and narrative evidence that differences between
the FOMC and staff forecasts help predict monetary policy shocks, suggesting that policymakers act










Berkeley, CA  94720-3880
and NBER
dromer@econ.berkeley.edu 
  A key issue in monetary policymaking is the appropriate division of labor between the 
professional staff of the central bank and the appointed policymakers.  Svensson (1999) argues 
that the appropriate role of a policymaking group, such as the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) in the United States, is to make judgments about social welfare, taking as given the 
likely outcomes of different policies as estimated by the staff.  In this division, the staff is relied 
upon to assess current and prospective economic conditions and to forecast the likely effects of 
different policies.  Policymakers’ only role is to decide which of the various options should be 
chosen. 
  The obvious alternative is for policymakers to also play a role in forecasting and in 
predicting the consequences of policy actions.  In this division, policymakers supplement the 
staff’s analysis with their own information about likely economic developments and the effects 
of policy.  Their choice of a particular policy then reflects their views not only of desired 
outcomes, but also of prospective developments and of the working of the economy. 
  Which of these divisions of labor is best clearly cannot be determined from first 
principles.  It depends on the relative skill of the staff and the policymakers in forecasting and 
understanding the economy.  As a result, the answer may vary across times and places. 
  In the United States, policymakers certainly appear to believe they have useful 
information to add to the staff’s forecasts and estimated policy multipliers.  Perhaps the strongest 
evidence of this comes from the transcripts of FOMC meetings.  A significant portion of each 
meeting is devoted to the economic “go-around,” where each member of the FOMC gives his or 
her own view of prospective conditions.  Likewise, much of the discussion of appropriate policy 
focuses on the likely outcomes of actions, rather than on the desirability of one outcome over 
another.   2 
  In this paper, we test whether American policymakers do, in fact, have useful information 
in one particular area – forecasting.  The Board of Governors staff makes a comprehensive 
forecast before each FOMC meeting.  In conjunction with two of these meetings each year, the 
Federal Reserve reports information about the forecasts of members of the FOMC for inflation, 
unemployment, and real growth.  We compare these staff and policymaker forecasts for the 
period 1979-2001 with actual data to see if the FOMC forecasts contain useful information.  We 
find that, for the most part, they do not.   
  We also investigate the possible consequences of the FOMC’s misguided information.  In 
particular, we examine whether differences between the FOMC and staff forecasts help predict 
monetary shocks.  We find suggestive statistical and narrative evidence that they do.  This may 
indicate that the FOMC’s attempts to add information to the staff forecast are not just 
unsuccessful, but may lead to misguided actions. 
 
I.  Forecast Data 
  The FOMC prepares forecasts twice a year, in February and July.  The forecasts are 
contained in the Monetary Policy Report ( MPR) submitted to Congress as required by the 
Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act.  We examine the forecasts of 
inflation, unemployment, and real growth.  The forecasts in February are for inflation and growth 
over the four quarters ending in the fourth quarter of the current year, and for the unemployment 
rate in the fourth quarter of the current year.  The forecasts in July are for the same variables for 
both the current year and the next year. 
  The members of the FOMC first prepare their forecasts before the FOMC meeting 
preceding the release of the MPR.  In preparing these forecasts, members have access to the staff   3 
forecast.  At the meeting, the staff presents its forecast and summarizes the members’ forecasts, 
and the members discuss their views about the economic outlook.  After the meeting, FOMC 
members have about a week to revise their forecasts. 
  The first FOMC forecasts are those in the July 1979 MPR.  The forecasts of each variable 
are usually presented in terms of a range and a central tendency.  The range shows the lowest and 
the highest forecasts of the individual members.  The central tendency shows the lowest and 
highest forecasts after removal of the extremes (typically the three lowest and three highest).  We 
use the midpoint of the central tendency as our figure for the FOMC forecast.  When the central 
tendency is not reported, we use the midpoint of the range. 
  The exact variables forecast have evolved over time.  For inflation, the forecasts are for 
the GNP implicit price deflator until July 1988, the CPI from February 1989 to July 1999, and 
the chain-type price index for personal consumption expenditures thereafter.  For growth, the 
forecasts are for real GNP through July 1991 and real GDP thereafter. 
  The staff forecasts for the same variables are contained in the “Greenbooks” prepared 
roughly a week before each FOMC meeting.  The Greenbooks are available only with a five-year 
lag.  Our sample therefore ends in 2001. 
  When the forecasts are for variables in the National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIPA), such as GDP, we measure outcomes using the so-called “final” estimates, which are 
released roughly three months after the end of the quarter.  These slightly revised data are likely 
to correspond most closely to what the FOMC and staff were trying to forecast.  For non-NIPA 
variables, such as unemployment, which are not subject to consistent, immediate revisions, we 
measure outcomes using the data as originally released.  We typically take these data from the 
Greenbook for the meeting following the release.   4 
  Further details about the data are described in the Data Appendix. 
 
II.  Does the FOMC Have Value Added in Forecasting? 
  To see if the FOMC forecasts contain useful information relative to the staff forecasts, we 
estimate regressions of the form: 
 
(1)                                                        Xt = a + bSt + cPt + et, 
 
where X is the realized value of some variable, such as inflation, and S and P are the staff and 
policymaker (FOMC) forecasts of that variable.  Since the members of the FOMC know the staff 
forecasts when they prepare their forecasts, the hypothesis that the FOMC forecasts are rational 
predicts a = b = 0, c = 1.  Our focus, however, is on the narrower question of whether the FOMC 
forecasts contain useful information relative to the staff’s.  Thus, our main interest is in whether 
c is positive.  That is, conditional on the staff’s forecast, does the variable being forecast on 
average turn out higher when the FOMC’s forecast is higher? 
  The structure of the forecasts suggests that the residuals in (1) are unlikely to be i.i.d.  
The forecast horizons range from less than six months to well over a year, and not all realized 
values for earlier forecasts are known when a forecast is made.  Thus, the residuals are likely to 
exhibit both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
  We therefore estimate the regression in two ways.  First, as a baseline, we use ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and compute conventional OLS standard errors.  Second, we employ 
weighted least squares (WLS).  The variance of e is allowed to depend on whether the forecast is 
a February forecast, a July forecast for the current year, or a July forecast for the next year; the 
three variances are estimated from the data.  For the WLS estimates, we compute Newey-West   5 
standard errors with three lags (which is the maximum lag at which one would expect any serial 
correlation). 
  The results are given in Table 1.  The most striking finding is for inflation.  The OLS 
estimates suggest that someone trying to predict inflation who had access to both the staff and 
FOMC forecasts should put a coefficient of 1.10 (t = 2.82) on the staff forecast and a coefficient 
of –0.10 (t = –0.28) on the FOMC forecast.  This suggests that the FOMC forecast does not 
contribute useful information.  Indeed, the fact that the coefficient on the FOMC forecast is 
negative (albeit not significantly so) suggests that someone trying to forecast inflation should 
move away from the FOMC forecast, not toward it.  Taking into account the likely 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the residuals only strengthens the results.  The WLS 
estimates with robust standard errors show that the weight on the staff forecast in predicting 
inflation is 1.40 (t = 5.54) and that on the FOMC forecast is more negative and close to 
significant. 
  The results for unemployment are similar to those for inflation.  In this case, the OLS 
estimates suggest putting a weight of essentially one (t = 2.52) on the staff forecast and a weight 
of virtually zero on the FOMC forecast.  The estimates using WLS and robust errors raise the 
weight on the FOMC forecast slightly, but it remains small and very far from significant. 
  For real growth, the results are slightly supportive of the FOMC having useful 
information.  The OLS estimates indicate weights of 0.25 on the staff forecast and 0.63 on the 
FOMC forecast.  Neither weight, however, is significantly different from zero.  Correcting for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation has little effect on the point estimates, but makes the 
standard errors considerably larger.   
  In largely failing to add value to the staff forecast, the FOMC is in good company.     6 
Romer and Romer (2000) find that someone trying to forecast economic outcomes who had 
access to both the Greenbook and a range of high-profile commercial forecasts should put little 
or negative weight on the commercial forecasts.  FOMC members, however, have a key 
advantage over commercial forecasters:  access to the Greenbook.  Thus, at the very least, they 
could make forecasts that differed only trivially from the staff’s.  In this case, the FOMC and 
staff forecasts would be nearly collinear, and the coefficients could not be estimated with any 
precision.  To a considerable extent, this is what is occurring with the forecasts of real growth. 
  The FOMC should be able not just to match the staff, however, but to do better.  Because 
policymakers are allowed to revise their forecasts after the FOMC meeting where the forecasts 
are discussed, they have a potential data advantage of up to two weeks.  Likewise, FOMC 
members are less constrained than the staff in what they can assume about future policy actions.  
The fact that for inflation and unemployment, the coefficient on the staff forecast is large and 
significant while that on the FOMC forecast is effectively zero implies not just that FOMC 
members fail to add information, but that their efforts to do so are counterproductive. 
  One question is whether the usefulness of the FOMC forecasts has changed over time.  It 
is possible, for example, that as the FOMC has come to include more economists and 
professional forecasters, the value of its information has increased.  We test for this possibility 
by estimating the regressions separately for the two halves of the sample.  The first covers the 
forecasts from July 1979 to July 1990; the second covers those from February 1991 to July 2001.   
The results do suggest a change over time.
1  For inflation, the weights on the staff and 
FOMC forecasts for the first half of the sample are 1.54 (t = 2.46) and –0.54 (t = –0.89), 
respectively; for the second half, they are 0.84 (t = 1.94) and –0.22 (t = –0.42).  The results for 
the unemployment rate show a similar move toward the FOMC having more useful information 
                                                 
1 We focus on the OLS estimates for simplicity.  The WLS results are similar.   7 
over time.  The weights on the staff and FOMC forecasts change from 1.59 (t = 2.16) and –0.66 
(t = –0.87) to 0.51 (t = 1.31) and 0.35 (t = 0.88).  The change for the real growth regressions is 
more dramatic.  The weights on the staff and FOMC forecasts for the first half of the sample are 
0.86 (t = 1.21) and –0.03 (t = –0.04), respectively; for the second half they are –0.81 (t = –1.17) 
and 1.74 (t = 2.45).  For real growth the FOMC appears to have had no useful information before 
1991, but significant useful information in more recent years. 
  As a check on our analysis, we examine the importance of outliers.  Figure 1 shows the 
partial association between the actual series and the FOMC forecast for each variable for the full 
sample.
2  The three panels show that there are fairly few obvious influential observations.
3  One 
that shows up in each case as damaging the FOMC’s predictive power is the observation for the 
next-year forecast corresponding to the FOMC meeting in July 1981.  When we exclude this 
observation, the results for inflation are little changed; those for the unemployment rate move 
slightly toward the FOMC having some useful information; and those for real growth move 
strongly in favor of the FOMC.  Another observation that could be damaging the FOMC’s 
apparent predictive power for inflation, but not for unemployment or real growth, is that 
corresponding to the FOMC meeting in February 1990.  Excluding this observation does not in 
any way rescue the hypothesis that the FOMC inflation forecast contains useful information:  the 
weights for this sample are 0.95 (t = 2.55) on the staff forecast and 0.03 (t = 0.09) on the FOMC 
forecast.  From these and other exercises, we conclude that the results in Table 1 reflect 
consistent patterns in the data.  The FOMC’s attempts to improve on the Greenbook forecasts, 
                                                 
2 That is, for each variable we regress both the FOMC forecast and the actual value on the Greenbook 
forecast and a constant, and then do a scatter plot of the residuals. 
3 The absence of obvious outliers does not mean that the differences between the FOMC and staff 
forecasts are small.  The residuals of the regression of the FOMC forecast on the staff forecast for the 
three variables shown along the horizontal axes are not tightly bunched around the origin.  Likewise, if 
one looks directly at the forecast differences, one finds substantial variation.  The standard deviations of 
the forecast differences are 0.28 for inflation; 0.23 for unemployment; and 0.35 for real growth.   8 
with the partial exception of the forecasts for real growth, have been largely unsuccessful. 
  Our results show that in constructing its forecasts, the FOMC is not using the information 
in the staff forecasts effectively.  One might nevertheless be interested in the relative accuracy of 
the FOMC and staff forecasts.  Relative accuracy depends on two factors:  how the realized 
value of the variable being forecast moves on average with the two forecasts, and the average 
bias of the forecasts.  The first factor is shown by our regressions.  With regard to bias, both the 
FOMC and the staff have been overly pessimistic on average about all three variables, with the 
FOMC being more biased for inflation and the staff being more biased for unemployment and 
real growth.  The average forecast error (actual value minus forecast) for inflation is –0.38                
(t = –3.62) for the FOMC and –0.25 (t = –2.49) for the staff.  For unemployment, the average 
errors are –0.09 (t = –0.94) for the FOMC and –0.15 (t = –1.76) for the staff.  For growth, they 
are 0.10 (t = 0.60) for the FOMC and 0.22 (t = 1.26) for the staff. 
  To assess overall forecast accuracy, we compute the mean squared errors (MSEs) of the 
various forecasts.  For inflation, where both the regression weights and the biases favor the staff, 
the MSE is 0.89 for the FOMC and 0.71 for the staff.  For unemployment, where the weights and 
biases work in opposite directions, the MSE is 0.57 for the FOMC and 0.54 for the staff.  And 
for real growth, where both factors slightly favor the FOMC, it is 1.99 for the FOMC and 2.10 
for the staff.  Thus, although the FOMC is not using its available information optimally, even for 
inflation its forecasts are not dramatically less accurate than the staff’s.  Nonetheless, the 
difference in the MSEs of the inflation forecasts is highly significant.  The differences in the 
MSEs for the other variables, in contrast, are far from significant.
4 
 
                                                 






2 = c + ut, where e
P and 
e
S are the FOMC and staff forecast errors, and examining the significance of c.   9 
III.  Do Forecast Differences Affect Policy Choices? 
  The failure of the FOMC to bring useful additional information to the monetary 
policymaking process raises an obvious question:  do policymakers act on their apparently 
useless information?  To put it even more bluntly, are the FOMC’s efforts to improve on the staff 
forecasts just ineffective, or are they a source of monetary policy mistakes? 
  To investigate this issue, we test whether the difference between the FOMC and staff 
forecasts of key variables is a significant predictor of monetary policy shocks.  As our measure 
of shocks, we use the series derived in Romer and Romer (2004).  This derivation involved 
reading the narrative record to identify what policymakers intended to happen to the federal 
funds rate after each FOMC meeting.  We then regressed the intended changes in the funds rate 
on the Greenbook forecasts of inflation, real growth, and the unemployment rate.  Our shock 
series is the residuals of this regression.  It shows times when the FOMC moved the funds rate in 
a way that differed from its usual response to the staff forecast.  One possible source of such 
unusual movements is differences between the FOMC and staff forecasts.   
To see if this is the case, we run regressions of the form: 
 
(2)                                                        Mt = a + b(Pt – St) + et, 
 
where M is our measure of monetary policy shocks, and P and S are again the FOMC and staff 
forecasts of some variable.  We consider the impact of the forecast differences for each variable 
(inflation, unemployment, and real growth) first individually and then in combination.  For the 
July meetings, when we have FOMC forecasts for both the current year and the next year, we   10 
measure P and S using FOMC and staff forecasts only for the current year.
5  
The results are given in Table 2.  The estimates suggest that forecast differences may be 
one source of monetary shocks.  When the differences for each variable are considered 
separately, the estimated impact on monetary policy is of the expected sign and marginally 
significant.  The point estimates suggest a relatively large impact.  For example, the estimates for 
inflation in row (1) show that an FOMC forecast of inflation one percentage point higher than the 
staff forecast is associated with an unusual rise in the federal funds rate of approximately 30 
basis points.  Similarly, an FOMC forecast of the unemployment rate one percentage point 
higher than the staff forecast is associated with an unusual fall in the federal funds rate of 50 
basis points. 
  The results in row (4) show the effect when the forecast differences for all three variables 
are included.  The point estimates and the statistical significance fall somewhat, but are 
qualitatively unchanged.  These results suggest that the forecast differences may combine to 
generate even larger monetary shocks.  For instance, if the FOMC is more pessimistic than the 
staff about inflation and more optimistic about unemployment and real growth, a combination 
that could plausibly occur, the coefficients predict a substantial unusual rise in the funds rate. 
  Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of the difference between the FOMC and the staff forecasts 
of inflation and the monetary shock series.  The figure indicates three FOMC meetings where the 
gap between the FOMC and staff forecasts was especially large, and where the FOMC’s 
behavior was consistent with the pattern suggested by the regressions.  At two of the meetings, in 
July 1979 and February 1982, the FOMC’s inflation forecast was well above the staff’s, and 
there were substantial contractionary monetary shocks.  At the third, in February 1991, the 
FOMC’s inflation forecast was well below the staff’s, and there was a substantial expansionary 
                                                 
5 Because the shock series ends in 1996, the sample period for these regressions is 1979-1996.   11 
shock.  We examine the transcripts of these three meetings to see if the statistical relationship 
may be capturing a genuine behavioral link.
6 
  In the July 1979 episode, FOMC members emphasized their differences from the staff 
forecast and urged short-run policy actions consistent with these differences.  For example, 
Governor Wallich said:  “I continue to think that we may be underestimating inflation” 
(Transcript, 7/11/79, p. 15), and urged raising the top of the funds rate target range to allow for 
tightening if the price of the dollar fell in the coming weeks (p. 42).  Likewise, Mr. Mayo said:  
“Although the staff forecast is a reasonable one, I find myself a little more pessimistic.  I am 
concerned about both the likelihood of less real growth and more inflation” (pp. 20-21).  He 
urged keeping the funds rate at its same, relatively high level (p. 44).  The discussion clearly 
suggests that gloomier forecasts of inflation than the staff were one reason the FOMC voted to 
keep policy tight despite high unemployment and fear of a recession. 
  The second of these episodes, February 1982, is less supportive of a causal link between 
the forecast differences and monetary shocks.  While members clearly noted their disagreement 
with the staff forecast, these differences do not appear to have been central to their actions.  
Money growth had been enormous in the previous month, and much of the meeting revolved 
around policymakers’ view of what would happen to velocity.  The increase in the funds rate 
target seemed to be the result of an attempt to keep money growth rates in the target ranges. 
  In the third episode, February 1991, policymakers clearly overruled the staff on the 
forecast and acted on the basis of their own views.  In the go-around, member after member said 
the staff forecast was too optimistic about real growth and predicted that inflation would be 
lower than the staff forecast as a result.  Chairman Greenspan summarized the committee’s view 
                                                 
6 Actual inflation in 1979 and 1982 was closer to the staff forecast than to the FOMC forecast, while in 
1991 it was closer to the FOMC forecast.  Thus, the three episodes fit with our overall finding that the 
FOMC does not on average improve on the staff forecast.   12 
by saying:  “And while we’ve all taken pot shots at the Greenbook forecast, it is not a zero 
probability forecast by any means” (Transcript, 2/6/91, p. 49).  He went on to say:  “I actually 
don’t quite agree with the Greenbook because I think the inflation forecast is too high.  From 
what I can sense, looking at the internal price structure of a lot of companies and talking to a lot 
of people …, it may turn out to be doing better” (p. 49).  This belief led Greenspan to conclude:  
“[W]e may have to move it [the interest rate structure] down further as insurance” (p. 49).  Other 
members also drew the link between their differences from the staff forecast and their view of 
appropriate policy.  For example, Mr. Boehne said:  “I think the staff forecast, while well thought 
out, is on the rosy side.  … I’d rather err on the side of too much stimulus at this point rather than 
too little” (p. 24). 
  Thus, the narrative evidence, like the statistical analysis, is suggestive of a link between 
forecast differences and monetary policy actions.  It appears that monetary policymakers may 
indeed act on information that is of little or negative value. 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
  When it comes to forecasting, monetary policymakers in the United States do not have 
useful information relative to their staff.  Someone wishing to predict inflation and 
unemployment who had access to the forecasts of both the FOMC and the staff would be well 
served by discarding the FOMC forecast and just using the staff predictions.  Since the staff 
forecast reflects a great deal of effort by hundreds of highly trained professionals, the finding that 
policymakers do not have useful additional information is not especially surprising.  But since 
policymakers know the staff forecast when they make theirs, the finding that the staff forecast 
clearly contains information beyond what is in policymakers’ forecast indicates that the FOMC   13 
is not using its available information optimally in constructing its forecast. 
Yet, as the FOMC currently operates, policymakers’ forecasts play a role in policy.   
Much time is spent preparing individual forecasts and debating the staff forecast.  More 
importantly, we find suggestive statistical and narrative evidence that differences between the 
FOMC and staff forecasts are one source of monetary policy shocks.  Policymakers appear to 
base at least some decisions on their apparently useless information. 
  These findings suggest that a more effective division of labor within the Federal Reserve 
might be for the staff to present policymakers with policy options and related forecasted 
outcomes, and for policymakers to take those forecasts as given.  With this division, the role of 
the FOMC would be to choose among the suggested alternatives, not to debate the likely 
outcome of a given policy. 
  Finally, monetary policymakers in many countries are less likely to be experts than in the 
United States.  This suggests that the likelihood that they will have useful information is even 
smaller than for the FOMC.  For this reason, monetary policymakers elsewhere might wish to 
consider the possibility that they do not have additional information, and to encourage empirical 




The FOMC Forecasts.  The FOMC’s forecasts are presented in its Monetary Policy 
Reports (MPRs) to the Congress, which have been submitted each February and July since 1979.  
The MPRs are reprinted in both the Federal Reserve Bulletin and the Board of Governors Annual 
Report.  They are available on-line back to the July 1996 MPR. 
  Four variables are always forecast: nominal growth, real growth, inflation, and 
unemployment.  Growth rates are always fourth quarter to fourth quarter (Q4 to Q4), and the 
unemployment rate is always for Q4. In the February MPR, the forecasts are for the current year 
only.  In the July MPR, they are for the current year and the next year.   
  From the February 1983 MPR to the present, the forecasts are reported in terms of 
“ranges” and “central tendencies.”  It is fairly clear that the ranges go from the lowest to the 
highest forecast.  When the “Chart Shows” (see below) explain the central tendencies, they 
almost always say that they are obtained by dropping the three lowest and the three highest 
forecasts.  (The Chart Show preceding the February 1994 MPR says that those central tendencies 
are obtained by dropping only the lowest and highest two.  There are also occasional references 
to rounding in the Chart Shows.) 
  The first two MPRs that have forecasts say (or imply) that the forecasts are the Board’s 
and not the full FOMC’s; the next five are not clear about whether the forecasts incorporate the 
views of the Reserve Bank presidents who are not voting members of the FOMC.  In addition, 
the first seven MPRs only give ranges.  The language varies, sometimes implying that they are 
full ranges and sometimes that they are central tendencies. 
  The members first prepare their forecasts prior to the FOMC meeting that precedes the 
submission of the MPR.  Our understanding is that they have already received the Greenbook for 
the upcoming meeting by the time they prepare their forecasts.  The members are allowed to 
revise their forecasts between the meeting and the time the MPR is completed.  (We do not know 
whether they have always been allowed to do this, but they certainly have for a long time.) 
The staff presentation (known as the “Chart Show”) at the FOMC meeting preceding the 
MPR often includes a chart summarizing the members’ forecasts.  The forecasts presented in the 
Chart Shows are often not in exactly the same terms as the forecasts in the MPRs.  Sometimes 
the forecasts are for annual averages; early on, they are presented separately for Governors and 
Presidents; and the like.  And, because the members can revise their forecasts after the meeting, 
even when the forecasts are of exactly the same thing, the forecasts in the Chart Show often 
differ from the forecasts in the MPR. 
  The exact variables forecast have changed over time.  The first MPR, in February 1979, 
contained no forecasts.  From July 1979 to July 1988, the MPRs forecast nominal GNP growth, 
real GNP growth, inflation measured using the GNP deflator, and the unemployment rate.  (The 
February 1980 MPR also forecast employment growth and CPI inflation.  This is the only time 
additional variables have been forecast.)  The inflation variable switched to the CPI (CPI-U) in 
the February 1989 MPR, and then to the PCE chain-type price index in the February 2000 MPR.  
The switch from GNP to GDP for nominal and real growth occurred in the February 1992 MPR.  
In addition, the real growth measure changed base years, and then changed to chain-weighted, as 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) switched its measure. 
  The unemployment rate forecast has almost always been the civilian unemployment rate. 
For the MPRs from February 1983 through February 1986, however, it is not clear whether it   15 
was the civilian unemployment rate or the unemployment rate including members of the armed 
forces stationed in the United States (which is typically a tenth of a percentage point lower) that 
was being forecast.  It is clear that the Greenbooks used the civilian unemployment rate 
throughout (this can be seem by looking at the figures in the Greenbooks for the actual 
unemployment rate).  The MPRs for this period generally do not specify the exact unemployment 
concept being forecast.  Two (February 1983 and February 1986) indicate that the FOMC’s 
forecast is for the overall unemployment rate, and one (July 1985) indicates that it is for the 
civilian unemployment rate. 
  We have examined some transcripts from this period and found no discussion of this 
issue.  Our guess is that there was little concern about it.  For example, it is possible that the 
FOMC members were simply asked to prepare forecasts of the unemployment rate, without the 
exact concept being specified, and that the occasional notes in the MPRs specifying which 
unemployment concept was being forecast were added when the MPRs were being prepared.  
Given that it is clear from the Greenbooks that the Federal Reserve focused on the civilian 
unemployment rate throughout, we interpret the FOMC forecasts as being of that rate in all 
cases. 
 
  The Staff Forecasts. We take our figures for the staff forecasts from the Greenbook 
prepared for the FOMC meeting at which the members’ forecasts and the MPR were discussed. 
The Greenbook is typically prepared about a week before the FOMC meeting.  When the cover 
sheet of the forecast presents a figure for the exact variable being forecast (such as Q4 to Q4 real 
GNP growth), we use that figure.  When it does not, we compute it from the detailed forecast 
tables. 
  The charts presenting the FOMC forecasts also give the staff’s forecasts of the same 
variables.  With a few small exceptions (which we believe are typographical errors), these 
numbers agree with what is in the Greenbook for the same meeting.  As noted above, however, 
we use the figures from the Greenbooks in all cases. 
  The Greenbooks from year t are released at the end of year t+5.  Thus, the latest 
Greenbooks currently available are those from 2001. 
 
  Outcomes. For NIPA variables (nominal and real GNP and GDP growth, and inflation 
measured by the implicit GDP deflator or the PCE chain-type price index), we use the BEA’s 
“final” estimates.  This version of the data includes the two very rapid revisions the BEA does of 
each series.  The Q4 final estimates are typically released in March, and are first published in the 
March or April issue of the Survey of Current Business.  We compute percentage changes using 
numbers from the same issue of the Survey.  For example, our figure for real GDP growth in 
1999 is computed as the percentage change in the estimates of real GDP from 1998Q4 to 
1999Q4 from the April 2000 Survey. 
  For the CPI and the unemployment rate, our figures for outcomes are those first reported 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  Since the BLS did not construct its own quarterly 
averages of monthly figures for much of our sample, we use the figures for actual Q4 to Q4 CPI 
inflation and the actual Q4 unemployment rate from the first Greenbook prepared after the 
release of the December data.  This is always the Greenbook prepared in late January or the very 
beginning of February.  Since the last publicly available Greenbook is for the end of 2001, we 
take our figures for actual unemployment in 2001Q4 and 2002Q4 from the first issues of the 
Monthly Labor Review that report the unemployment rate for December of the corresponding   16 
year. 
  Our outcome measures correspond as closely as possible to the measures being forecast. 
For example, the July 1988 MPR forecast inflation for 1989 measured by the GNP deflator, 
while the February 1989 and July 1989 MPRs forecast inflation for 1989 measured by the CPI. 
We therefore use 1989 inflation measured by the deflator as the outcome corresponding to the 
first forecast, and 1989 inflation measured by the CPI as the outcome corresponding to the other 
two forecasts.  (One case where we cannot make the concepts line up exactly involves changes in 
base years.  For example, the February 1995 MPR forecast real growth in 1995 as measured by 
real GDP in 1987 dollars.  By the time the final estimates of 1995Q4 real GDP were released in 
early 1996, however, the BEA had switched to reporting chain-weighted real GDP, and no 
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Table 1 
Role of Staff and FOMC Forecasts in Predicting Actual Values 
 
                                               Constant            Staff Forecast       FOMC Forecast           R
2 
         Inflation 
    (1) OLS  –0.20 (0.22)  1.10   (0.39)  –0.10 (0.37)  0.86 
    (2) WLS  –0.26 (0.11)  1.40 (0.25)  –0.38 (0.25)  0.93 
 Unemployment 
    (3) OLS  0.26 (0.41)  0.97 (0.38)  –0.03 (0.40)  0.79 
    (4) WLS  0.21 (0.38)  0.78 (0.37)  0.17 (0.34)  0.89 
 Real  Growth 
    (5) OLS  0.43 (0.36)  0.25 (0.49)  0.63 (0.52)  0.44   
    (6) WLS  0.52 (0.58)  0.17 (0.88)  0.67 (0.90)  0.50 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the actual value of the variable being forecast. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  The weighted least squares regressions use 
Newey-West standard errors.    19 
Table 2 
Role of Forecast Differences in Predicting Monetary Policy Shocks 
 
                                                     Difference between FOMC and Staff Forecast for: 
                             Constant              Inflation        Unemployment      Real Growth           R
2 
 
  (1)  0.04 (0.06)  0.31 (0.20)          0.07 
  (2)  0.04 (0.06)      –0.50 (0.25)      0.11 
  (3)  0.03  (0.06)        0.31  (0.16) 0.11   
  (4)  0.01 (0.06)  0.23 (0.21)  –0.35 (0.31)  0.13 (0.20)  0.17 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the Romer and Romer (2004) measure of 
monetary shocks.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Figure 2 
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